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A Study in Contrasts: The Warren




Since mid-1975, the Burger Court has handed down an unprec-
edented number of significant decisions' under the Securities Act of
19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 All of these hold-
ings favor defendants4 and are the product of a Supreme Court that
takes a restrictive view of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. This restrictive
view is in sharp contrast to the Warren Court of 1964-1972.1 Just as
* B.A. 1965, College of theHoly Cross; J.D. 1968, Fordham University School of Law;
Associate Professor, San Diego University School of Law.
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1. The quantity of decisions is staggering. In terms of all the federal securities laws, the
Court's next most active period appears to be 1943-1947, when it decided the following nine
cases, only three of which involved the Acts: Penfield Co. of California v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585
(1947) (section 20(a) of 1933 Act); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946)
(section 1 l(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (b)(20)
(1976)); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (section 2(I) of the 1933 Act); North
American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946) (section 1 l(b)(I) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1976)); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S.
385 (1945) (section 24(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79x
(1976)); Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1945) (section 1 l(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1976)); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943) (section 2(1) of the 1933 Act); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 319 U.S. 61 (1943) (sections 201 and 203(a) of the Federal Power Act, as amended by
Public Utility Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824 and 824(b) (1976)); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943) (section 24(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79x (1976)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act].
4. The only Supreme Court decision in plaintiff's favor, SEC v. Sloan, 98 S. Ct. 1702
(1978), was actually a victory for potential defendants, for it restricted the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's power summarily to suspend trading in a particular security. See notes
118-25 and accompanying text infra.
5. Strictly speaking, the Warren Court era ended in 1969 when Warren E. Burger re-
placed Earl Warren as Chief Justice. The Court's expansive approach to the Acts, however, a
hallmark of Chief Justice Warren's tenure, continued through the 1972 decision of Affiliated
lower tribunals read the Warren Court as strongly encouraging
broad rulings and interpreted the Acts accordingly, one can expect
future judicial developments to mirror the Burger Court's recent,
dramatic turnaround.
This article examines the Supreme Court's significant decisions
under the Acts during both the Warren Court period of 1964-72 and
the Burger Court period of 1975 to the present. Six Warren Court
decisions and eight Burger Court decisions are analyzed as well as
their effect on lower court rulings. The examination reveals that the
approach of the Court to the federal securities laws is quite different
during each period.
II. The Warren Court
A. Signficant Decisions
An analysis of the 1964-19726 decisions produces two important
observations. First, each case was decided in favor of plaintiff in a
way that resulted in expanded coverage of the Acts. Second, the
Court interpreted the Acts with a remedial philosophy that en-
couraged such expansion.
1. Broad Holdings. -Three decisions, two of which frame the
eight-year period, bear witness to the Court's broad, plaintiff-ori-
ented holdings. The earliest, J. Case Co. v. Borak,7 concerned a
plaintiff shareholder who instituted an action for damages and other
relief8 for alleged misrepresentations in proxy material used in con-
nection with the merger of the shareholder's corporation.9 Plaintiff
based the suit partially upon section 14(a)10 of the 1934 Act and
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). It therefore seems appropriate to character-
ize the Supreme Court of 1964-72 as the Warren Court.
6. The author's view is that the six decisions examined in Part II are significant prima-
rily for their role in shaping judicial developments under the Acts. In addition to these six
decisions, the Court decided five cases during this period that directly involved the federal
securities laws. Only two concerned issues under the Acts-Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (section 16(b) of the 1934 Act) and SEC v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (section 3(a) of the 1933 Act). Neither Reliance nor two later
Court decisions involving section 16(b) are examined in this article. See note 81 infra.
7. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
8. The shareholder sought both rescission of the merger and damages. Id at 429-30.
Although the Court left the question of remedy for the trial court, it implied that a broad range
should be available. Id at 433-35.
9. Id at 429.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities ex-
change or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted secur-
ity) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
upon one of its implementing rules, 14a-9." Although the statute
clearly proscribed defendants' alleged misconduct, it did not estab-
lish private action for its violation. Nevertheless, a unanimous Court
concluded that private parties have a right under Section 27 of the
1934 Act' 2 to bring suit for violation of section 14(a) of that Act.' 3
The Justices reasoned that implication of the private action accorded
with the broad remedial purposes of section 14(a)' 4 and that private
enforcement of the proxy rules is a necessary supplement to SEC
action 5 in processing proxy solicitation materials. Borak, which
marked the Court's first recognition of an implied right of action
under the federal securities laws, thus became the basis for subse-
quent lower court rulings in favor of implied private claims.
16
After Borak it was inevitable that the Court would have to re-
solve disputes about the elements of a section 14(a) private action
and the Court did so in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.'7 In Mills,
minority shareholders of a merged corporation charged that man-
agement's proxy statement used to obtain shareholder approval of
the merger was defective because it did not state that the board of
directors, which supported the merger, was controlled by the acquir-
ing entity.' 8 At issue was the extent to which plaintiffs, as part of
their section 14(a) 9 claim, must establish that the alleged violations
actually caused the minority shareholders, some of whose votes were
necessary to consummate the merger, to vote in favor of the transac-
tion.2' The circuit court, basing its decision on its perception of the
11. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977), prohibits material misrepresentations and
omissions in connection with a proxy solicitation subject to § 14(a). See note 10 supra
12. Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), grants the federal district courts
jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created" under the Act.
13. 377 U.S. at 430-3 1. The opinion's lack of analysis with regard to this conclusion has
been highly criticized.
With respect, the opinion does not say very much except that private rights of action
will be implied when necessary to the achievement of the statutory objective. To
consider it "clear" without discussion that a private action under the proxy rules is
one "brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title" within the meaning
of § 27 . . . is to beg the question somewhat. . . . In short, the Court reached the
right result not for the wrong reason but for no reason at all.
5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2882 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
14. 377 U.S. at 431.
15. Id at 432.
16. "At least since [Borakl it has been accepted in securities law that when a statutory
provision imposes a duty on someone in favor of a class of protected persons, those persons
may sue for the 'statutory tort' committed when the duty is breached." Redington v. Touche
Ross & Co., [1978 - Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404, at 93,434 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 28, 1978). A number of commentators, however, have
recently taken the position that the Court has retreated from Borak's sweep. See, e.g., the
authorities cited in the dissenting opinion in Redington, id at 98,439 n.2.
17. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
18. Id at 378.
19. Plaintiffs claimed violation of § 14(a) and rule 14a-9. See notes 10- I supra.
20. The merger agreement required a 67% vote; the control group had 54%. 396 U.S. at379.
impossibility of inquiring into the mental processes of the minority
shareholders, held that causation would be presumed from the mate-
riality of the nondisclosure.2' Nevertheless, the court further ruled
that defendants could rebut this presumption, and thus defeat the
section 14(a) claim, by demonstrating the merger's fairness.22
On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the lower
court.23 The Court reasoned that the fairness test used by the lower
court added an extra barrier to small shareholders to challenge suc-
24cessfully a recommended proposal in a defective proxy statement.24
Moreover, the Supreme Court's formulation of causation was less
constrictive than that of the appellate court.
Where there has been a finding of materiality a shareholder has
made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the vio-
lation and the injury for which he seeks redress if ... he proves
that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect
in the solicitation, was an essential link in the accomplishment of
the transaction.25
Thus, Mills relaxed the causation requirement by holding that cau-
sation "equals materiality plus essentiality of proxy solicitation.
26
Any lingering doubts about the Justices' bias toward easy access to
the federal courts27 for violations of section 14(a) and the proxy rules
vanished with their statement that the test for causation "resolv[ed]
doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect" 2 -that is,
21. 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968). The district court had entered an interlocutory sum-
mary judgment determining liability against defendants under one of plaintiffs' counts, 281 F.
Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), but the circuit court held that an issue of fact was presented with
respect to the causal connection between the deficiency in the proxy statement and the merger
of the corporations, 403 F.2d at 435.
22. Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968), Yacated, 396 U.S. 971
(1970). The discussion of causation by both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court was in
the context of a completed transaction for which prospective relief was no longer available.
23. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
24. Id at 382 n.5.
25. Id at 385.
26. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.17(554), at 86.12 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as A. BROMBERG]. The Court in Mills expressly disclaimed that it was deciding the
causation question in a situation in which management controls a number of shares sufficient
to approve the transaction without any minority votes. 396 U.S. at 385 n.7. In a recent action
involving such circumstances, defendants cited five of the Court's latest decisions to support
their contention that the current Court would hold that causation is not present as a matter of
law when management controls enough votes to carry the day. The trial court disagreed and
ruled that causation is to be determined by the trier of fact. Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co.,
[1978 - Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 96,358, at 93,229-32 (C.D. Cal.). Profes-
sor Bromberg, quoted extensively by the Evmar court to support its holding, has collected
lower court decisions that split on the issue. I A. BROMBERG supra § 4.7(552), at 86.7-86.9, and
§ 4.7(554), at 86.9 and 86.11.
27. The Court added an incentive for § 14(a) actions by sanctioning an interim award of
attorneys' fees for the Mills plaintiffs, who had established a management violation of the
federal proxy rules. 396 U.S. at 389-97. Justice Black dissented on this point. Id at 397 (con-
curring and dissenting opinion). For a detailed discussion of awarding attorneys' fees, see
Note, Securities Regulation--Allowance 0/Attorney's Fees in 14(a) Derivati'e Suits, 49 N.C. L.
REV. 204 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Securities Regulations].
28. 396 U.S. at 385. One commentator, in analyzing Mills, remarked, "The [federal] judi-
cial system continues to protect a corporate shareholder through implementation of the rapidly
solicited shareholders.
The Mills Court's minimization of the importance of causation
in section 14(a) actions was followed two years later by a similar
relaxation for claims made under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act2 9 and
its anti-fraud cognate, rule 10b-5.3 ° In Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
Utah3 1 plaintiffs claimed that certain defendants had failed to dis-
close material facts in connection with plaintiffs' sales of securities to
these defendants and others.32 The Court found a compensable vio-
lation and announced that the proscriptions of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 are broad and obviously designed to be inclusive. 33 It there-
fore refused to read rule lOb-5 as restrictively3 4 as did the court of
appeals, which had required plaintiffs to establish reliance upon ma-
terial misrepresentations to sustain their section 10(b) claim.35 In-
stead, six Justices36 ruled that
under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recov-
ery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in
expanding anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Note, Securities Reg-
ulation-Shareholder Derivatie Suits under Rule 14a-9, 49 N. C. L. REV. 215 (1970).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 76j(b) (1976) provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
31. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
32. Affiliated Ute involved two consolidated actions that originated in a series of federal
statutes enacted during 1954-56 for the purpose of partitioning the assets of various American
Indian tribes. In the action pertinent to this discussion, mixed-blood members of the Ute tribe
had received shares of UDC, an incorporated association, in connection with the Ute partition
and distribution. Defendant bank, which employed Gale and Haslem, two individual defend-
ants, acted as both transfer agent and custodian for the UDC shares. Gale and Haslam created
a secondary market for UDC shares and arranged for the sale of plaintiffs' shares at prices
below the fair market value of the shares without disclosing to plaintiffs the disparity between
selling price and market value. This conduct violated subparagraphs (1) and (3) of rule lOb-5.
406 U.S. at 152-53.
33. 406 U.S. at 152.
34. Id at 152-53.
35. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 128
(1972).
36. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision. This obligation to dis-
close and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact.
3 7
The Court in Affiliated Ule thus expanded the availability of the Acts
to plaintiffs38 and held against defendants just as it did in every other
significant decision that it rendered under the Acts between 1964 and
1972. 39
2. Remedial Philosophy. -These Warren Court decisions are
noteworthy not only for their expansive holdings, but also for the
remedial philosophy underlying them. The Court's guiding interpre-
tive canon' was illustrated in the unanimous opinion in Tcherepenin
v. Knight,4 1 in which plaintiffs brought a section 10(b) class action,
claiming that they had been induced by fraudulent sales literature to
purchase withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan associa-
tion that subsequently went into voluntary liquidation. Defendants
contended that the shares were not securities subject to the 1934
Act.42 Presented with its first opportunity to construe the term secur-
ity under the 1934 Act,4 3 the Court announced that it would be
'guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The
Securities Exchange Act quite clearlyfalls into the category of reme-
dial legislation. " The Court thus had little difficulty fitting capital
shares into the broad concept of security45 developed by its earlier
1933 Act decisions.
46
37. 406 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted). The terms "reliance" and "causation in fact"
in Affiliated Ule apparently are used interchangeably, which is not an uncommon phenome-
non. See 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, at §§ 8.6(1) & 8.7(1), at 209, 213.
38. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, at § 4.7(554), at 86.11. "The Supreme Court's adop-
tion of. . . [the] liberalized test indicates an especial willingness to depart from the formula of
common law fraud in order to make rule 10b-5 a more effective deterrent of deceptive prac-
tices." The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 270 (1972).
Affiliated Ule involved a face-to-face transaction, see I A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, at
§ 4(1), at 68.11, and its causation test has been held inapplicable to the open market situation.
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
Contra, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. See notes 40-64 and accompanying text infra.
40. This is not to say that the Warren Court ignored such interpretative tools as statutory
language see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466-47 (1969)) or legislative intent see
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964)). The Court's use of such guideposts,
however, is strongly colored by its remedial philosophy.
41. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
42. Holders had the right under certain circumstances to withdraw the money paid for
their capital shares. 389 U.S. at 337. This feature and other characteristics, id at 343-44, dis-
tinguished the capital shares from traditional corporate stock that is indisputably a security.
43. The 1934 Act definition of a security is contained in § 3(a)(I0) of that Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1976). The 1933 Act definition is found in § 2(l) of that statute, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(b)(1) (1976).
44. 398 U.S. at 336 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
45. Id at 338. One commentator analyzed Tcherpenin as possibly reflecting a restrictive
trend in the definition of a security, an analysis that seems unfounded. Note, Licenses-Sales
ofStock-Withdrawable Capital Shares, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REV, 1123 (1968).
46. 389 U.S. at 336 n.9. The Court found that the capital shares resembled investment
188
Equally representative of this expansive philosophy is SEC v.
National Securities, Inc. " In this case the Commission sought to un-
wind a merger of two insurance companies, charging material defi-
ciency in the proxy materials sent to the minority shareholders of
one company.48 One issue before the Court was whether the minor-
ity shareholders' exchange of their old stock for the new company's
shares constituted a purchase within the meaning of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, 49 both of which require that the prohibited conduct
be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.5" Although
almost twenty years had passed since a federal judge had found a
private damages action under section l0(b)," National Securities
marked the Court's first venture into what it described as "virgin
territory[,] .. .an area where glib generalizations and unthinking
abstractions are major occupational hazards."5 " Finding no help in
the 1934 Act's definitions of purchase and sale, 53 the majority asked
whether defendants' alleged misconduct was the type of fraudulent
behavior that the statute and rule were designed to forbid.5 4 With-
out refering to legislative history, analyzing judicial precedent, or ex-
amining input from the Commission, the Court answered the
question in the affirmative.
Whatever the terms "purchase" and "sale" may mean in other
contexts. . . . It/he broad anti-fraud purposes of the statute and the
rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of
situation. Therefore we conclude that [the minority] shareholders
"purchased" shares in the new company by exchanging them for
their old stock.55
contracts, id at 338, a term occurring in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts' definitions of a security,
see note 43 supra, that the Court had earlier focused upon in resolving the issue of a security
vel non under the earlier statute, see note 97 infra.
47. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
48. Defendants controlled Company A and purchased a controlling interest in Company
B. The Commission claimed that the minority shareholders of Company B were not told in
the proxy materials that the surviving entity would have to pay part of the cost of acquiring
defendants' interest in Company B. Id at 455.
49. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, see note 10 supra, did not apply to the solicitation, 393
U.S. at 468.
50. See notes 29-30 supra.
51. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
52. 393 U.S. at 465.
53. Sections 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1976) (purchase), and 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(14) (1976) (sale). The Court took two analytic steps before examining the statutory
language. First, it dismissed defendants' contention that rule 133 (since repealed) of the 1933
Act, which excluded a merger from the definition of an offer or sale for purposes of § 5 of the
1933 Act, should be applied to a § 10(b) claim. Second, it stressed that the correct approach to
statutory language was to examine its meaning in context, an approach to which the Court
arguably did not adhere. 393 U.S. at 466.
54. 393 U.S. at 467.
55. Id at 467 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Perhaps troubled by its haste, the
majority felt constrained to add that its ruling did no violence to the language of the statute.
Id at 467-68.
The implications inherent in the majority's expansive approach to section 10(b) were not
lost upon dissenting Justice Harlan. In prophetic fashion he observed that "the decision has
far-reaching radiations, despite the fact that the precise issue presented is a narrow one." 393
Probably the most striking example of the Warren Court's re-
medial style is Superintendant of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. 16 This case, perhaps the Warren Court's most significant deci-
sion under the Acts,5 7 involved the purchase of control of Manhattan
Casualty Company. Proceeds from the sale of Manhattan's bonds
had been fraudulently misappropriated to accomplish the acquisi-
tion, and plaintiff claimed that the fraud violated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5."8 Because misappropriation of the bond sale proceeds
did not affect the bonds' sale or threaten the securities markets, the
Second Circuit found the nexus to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 ab-
sent.59
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, however, Justice
Douglas announced, "We do not read [section] 10(b) as narrowly as
the Court of Appeals; it is not 'limited to preserving the integrity of
the securities markets . . . . Section 10(b) must be readflexibly, not
technically and restrictivey. "60 In language as loose
6' as it is broad62
U.S. at 470 (dissenting opinion). Professor Bromberg includes National Securities in his list of
judicial milestones in Section 10(b)'s "expansionary trend." 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26 at
§ 2.2(46), at 22.12. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 257 (1969).
56. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
57. "Not since Erie v. Tompkins has a single case dominated an area of federal law the
way Bankers Life has that of litigation under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934." Ryan,
Bankers Life. Birnbaum Revisited, 4 Loy. CHi. L. J. 47 (1973).
58. The complaint alleged that Bankers Life & Casualty Co. sold all Manhattan's stock
to one of the individual defendants. He, along with other defendants, engineered a complex
scheme that involved, in part, convincing Manhattan's directors to sell certain of Manhattan's
treasury bonds. Defendants represented to Manhattan's directors that the bond sale proceeds
would be exchanged for a certificate of deposit of equal value. Instead, they used the proceeds
fraudulently to finance the purchase of Manhattan's stock from Bankers Life. Manhattan sub-
sequently failed and its liquidator instituted an action against Bankers Life and others con-
nected with the transaction, claiming violations of §§ 17(a) and 10(b) of the 1933 and the 1934
Acts. 404 U.S. at 7-9.
59. 430 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In essence the Second
Circuit "disconnected" the securities transaction from the misconduct that had led Manhat-
tan's directors to believe it would actually receive the proceeds of sale.
60. 404 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
61. [Mlost importantly, Bankers Life generally will offer little guidance to future
courts faced with the task of interpreting the "in connection with" clause and thus the
scope of rule lOb-5. This deficiency derives, in part, from the Court's selection of a
case with such an unusual fact situation. It also stems from the Court's failure in the
course of its reasoning to articulate with precision how closely connected the fraud and
the securities transaction must be.
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 263 (1972) (emphasis added).
Bankers Life did not determine the validity of what is perhaps the most significant judicial
restraint imposed upon the implied right of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5; namely, that
plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of securities. 404 U.S. at 13-14 n.10. See notes 66-74 and
accompanying text infra. Although many commentators have discussed the impact of Bankers
Lfe upon this limitation, the obscurity of the Court's opinion led them to contradictory con-
clusions. See Note, Bankers Life Payingfor a Corporation by Selling Its Securities Violates
lOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 465, 485 (purchaser-seller doctrine ill-defined and indefensible). But cf.
Ryan, supra note 57, at 67 (purchaser-seller restriction ratified). See also Note, Superintendent
ofInsurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.: Supreme Court Expansion ofRule l0b-5, 26 Sw.
L.J. 800, 807-08 (1972).
62. Professor Bromberg classifies judicial interpretation of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 into
two general modes, mechanical and jurisprudential. The latter focuses on perceived congres-
sional purpose concerning the scope of the statute and rule on whether, as a matter of policy, a
the Court then held that the required connection was present be-
cause the claimed deceptive practices touched Manhattan's sale of
securities as an investor.63 The Court's response to the connection
issue in Bankers Ltfe had become a familiar one-interpret the Acts
in a broad, remedial manner.
Perhaps more important, though, than either the wide ranging
holdings of the six decisions or their remedial philosophy is the im-
pression they cumulatively offer about the Warren Court's interpre-
tation of the Acts. Four decisions reversed narrower lower court
rulings'M and none contained any significant thoughts of limitation.
This expansive approach to the Acts was not lost upon the lower
courts who followed the path that the Supreme Court paved for
them.
B. Effect Upon Lower Courts
More than a quarter of a century ago the second circuit imposed
an important restriction on the judicially implied private action
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by limiting the class of plaintiffs
to those who actually purchased or sold securities involved in the
alleged fraud.6" This restriction became known as the Birnbaum rule.
Over a period of time, the lower courts developed exceptions66 to this
rule that permitted plaintiffs who were not literal purchasers or sell-
ers to maintain actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Given
the tenor of the Warren Court's decisions under the Acts, it was only
a matter of time before gradual judicial erosion of the rule became
particular transaction is within the scope of federal concern. At least until recently, this ap-
proach has probably led to expansive holdings on the connection issue. I A. BROMBERG,
supra note 26 at § 4.7(572), at 88.21-.22.
63. 404 U.S. at 12-13.
64. Only Borak affirmed the appellate court's holding. 377 U.S. at 428. The court of
appeals in National Securities did not reach the § 10(b) issues subsequently decided by the
Supreme Court. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 387 F.2d 25, 29 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 453
(1969).
65. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
Actually, the purchaser/seller standing requirement was only one of three limitations im-
posed by the Birnbaum Court, which stated that § 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securi-
ties rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and. . . extended protec-
tion only to the defrauded purchaser or seller." Id at 464.
The first limitation was negated by Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 10-11 n.7 (1971). The second, undermined by Bankers Life, (see I A. BROMBERG, supra
note 26, at § 4.7(522), at 84.31-32, has been revitalized to some degree by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See text accompanying
notes 158-85 infra The validity of the third, the so-called Birnbaum rule, was reaffirmed by the
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See notes 82-89 and
accompanying text, infra..
66. For a complete discussion of these exceptions see GALLAGHER, 10b-5 After Blue Chip
Stamps.- How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK L. REv. 1, 8-22 (1975). See also I A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 26 at § 4.7(560-66), at 87-88.8.
outright rejection.67 This result occurred in the seventh circuit in
1973 in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 68
Plaintiffs in Eason, shareholders of a failed corporation, had
guaranteed their corporation's notes in a transaction that clearly
made the corporation, but none of the plaintiffs, a seller of securi-
ties.69 Rather than stretching the Birnbaum rule to accommodate
plaintiffs, the seventh circuit repudiated it. Because no other appel-
late court had taken this course, the Eason court devoted considera-
ble attention to explaining the basis for its holding.
The language of Rule lOb-5 itself describes any act or practice
which operates as a fraud or deceit "upon any person in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security." The Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that this language should be given a broad and
flexible construction. [A] formal purchaser-seller limitation is not
consistent with the overriding requirement that, in construing the
1934 Act, "form should be disregarded for substance and the em-
phasis should be on economic reality.",
70
Focusing on a phrase from Bankers Life7 1 and pointing to the role
of rule lOb-5 in protecting investors, the circuit court decided that
the coverage of the rule extends beyond purchasers and sellers. 72 Al-
though the court acknowledged defendant's argument that abandon-
ing Birnbaum might significantly increase the federal courts' work
load,73 it responded that "the volume of future litigation that was
more clearly predictable as a consequence of the Supreme Court's
holding in the Bankers Life case was not even mentioned in the
Court's opinion as a possible objection to its broadened interpreta-
tion of Rule lOb-5 . . . .
The holding in Eason was exceptional in that it is the only ap-
67. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 768 n.3 (1975).
68. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
69. Plaintiffs were shareholders in the Bank Service Corporation, which purchased the
leasing division of David Waite Pontiac, Inc. by issuing 7,000 Bank Service shares to Waite
and assuming the liabilities of the leasing business, including notes payable to General Motors
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). Plaintiffs delivered to GMAC personal guarantees on the
notes. After the leasing business failed and Bank Service defaulted on the notes, GMAC sued
Bank Service's individual shareholders on the notes in state court. These shareholders in turn
began a federal action for alleged fraud in Bank Service's acquisition of the leasing business in
violation of § 10(b) and rule lob-5. Id at 655-66.
For a further discussion of the case see GALLAGHER, supra note 66 at 19-22.
70. 490 F.2d at 659 (footnote & citation omitted) (emphasis added).
71. The court considered the following phrase: "Manhattan suffered injury as a result of
deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor. " Id at 659 (emphasis in origi-
nal). See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
72. 490 F.2d at 659.
Although no Supreme Court holding is inconsistent with the view that only pur-
chasers or sellers of securities are protected by Rule lOb-5, we think that the Court's
opinionsfairy imply that the rule was intended to protect a broader class ofpersons... .
who, in their capacity as investors [not as purchasers or sellers,] suffer significant in-
jury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction
Id (emphasis added).
73. Id at 660. The court apparently believed that such an increase would not result.
74. Id at 660-61.
peflate court decision to directly discard the Birnbaum rule.7 5 Yet the
decision was anything but exceptional in its willingness to forge an
expansive holding. Eason clearly perceived the Court as an advo-
cate of a remedial approach to issues arising under the Acts. Indeed,
so strong was the remedial strain running through the Warren
Court's decisions that the Eason panel was quite comfortable citing
Tcherpenin, which dealt with the statutory definition of a security,76
to support a broadening of an anti-fraud provision. Moreover, its
perception of the Warren Court as a champion of a liberal approach
to the Acts was certainly consistent with that of the other circuits.
Whether the issue was interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-
5,77 implication of a private damages action for violations of the Wil-
liams Act,78 or the existence of a security,79 the result from the lower
courts was the same-a broad holding mandated, or at the very least
blessed, by the Supreme Court.
III. The Burger Court's Shift in Emphasis
A. Sign#fcant Decisions
An analysis of eight significant Supreme Court decisions80
75. One other district court matched Eason's directness. Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360
F. Supp. 490, 494-95 (D. Utah 1973).
76. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
77. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976) (10b-5 action not defined by the limits of common-law fraud and must be adapted to
the overriding purpose of enforcing the federal securities laws); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974) (open market purchasers of
securities have a § 10(b) claim against those who trade on inside information and the non-
trading tippers, despite a lack of privity).
78. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 356 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (defeated tender-offeror has an implied private damages action
against its successful rival and the target corporation for violation of § 14(e) of the 1934 Act).
But see notes 142-56 and accompanying text infra.
79. We have found no case dealing with this particular language; but in view of the
Supreme Court's policy of giving a broad reading to the definition of a security [cit-
ing Tcherepnin] and its generally expansive construction of the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act, [citing National Securities] we must read [§ 3(a)(10)]
literally so as to include the [loan] participation. . . within the security category.
Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'i Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.
1969); see also Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1253 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974),
rev'd sub nom United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Supreme Court decisions since mid-1975 that directly relate to the federal securities
laws but that are not discussed herein include the following: E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Collins, 434 U.S. 917 (1977); (SEC discretion in approving merger of investment company into
an affiliate under § 17 of Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1977), up-
held); Radzanower v. Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (venue in securities suit against
national banking association governed by more limited provisions of § 94 of National Banking
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976), rather than those of§ 27 of the 1934 Act); United States v. National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (SEC exercise of regulatory authority under
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l-80a-52 (1976), and Maloney Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1976), confers implied antitrust immunity for restrictions of secondary markets in
mutual fund shares); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (SEC regula-
tion of stock exchange fixed commission rates provides immunity from antitrust action chal-
lenging fixed rates).
handed down since mid-19751 discloses a transformation in the
Court's approach to the coverage of the Acts. This transformation is
especially evident in the Court's restriction of the Acts' coverage and
in its replacement of the Warren Court's remedial philosophy with
interpretative tools designed to shape narrow holdings.
1. Narrow Holdings. -Despite the Court's refusal in 1974 to
review Eason, just one year later the Court, in Blue Chq, Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,82 held that the Birnbaum rule is sound and
should be followed. a3 The Blue Chio plaintiff claimed that a docu-
ment offering securities emphasized various negative aspects of the
issuer in a misleading manner and fraudulently induced plaintiff to
refuse to purchase the securities.8 4 A divided panel of the ninth cir-
cuit, faced with a plaintiff that was neither a purchaser nor seller of
securities, added another exception to the Birnbaum rule and upheld
plaintiff's standing to bring a section 10(b) claim.85 In a 6-3 decision
reversing the ninth circuit,86 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
The Court changed its mind about deciding whether one who accepts a pledge of stock is
a "purchaser" and one who releases a pledge a "seller" of securities for purposes of § 10(b).
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 928 (1977), cert.
dirmissed, 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
81. Excluded from this article are those Supreme Court decisions involving § 16(b) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b) (1976), which imposes liability for so-called short-swing prof-
its--those generated by purchases and sales of securities within a six-month period. Section
16(b) decisions, for the purposes of this article, are viewed as a distinct element in the Court's
interpretation of the Acts, having limited precedential value for other areas. An extensive
discussion of § 16(b) is found in Wentz, Rening A Crude Rule.- The Pragmatic Approach to
Section 16(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of1934, 70 Nw. L. REv. 221 (1975). For the latest
Supreme Court pronouncement in this area see Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec.
Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
82. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
83. Id at 749. One commentator found no compelling reason for the Court's grant of
certiorari in Blue Chip because the ninth circuit's decision "was consistent with the previous
pattern of limited exceptions to the Birnbaum doctrine." Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 895
(1977). Lowenfels' view, however, may be at odds with the following statement from the Blue
Chip opinion:
While the Birnbaum rule has been flexibly interpreted by lower federal courts, we
have been unable to locate a single decided case from any court in the 20-odd years
of litigation since the Birnbaum decision which would support the right of persons
who were in the position of respondent here to bring a private suit under Rule lOb-5.
421 U.S. at 751 (footnotes omitted).
84. Plaintiff and other members of the class plaintiff claimed to represent were offered
common shares of a newly formed corporation pursuant to the terms of a consent decree set-
tling an antitrust action brought by the United States. Plaintiff alleged that the prospectus
offering the shares deliberately placed undue emphasis on the negative aspects of the status
and future prospects of the new corporation to discourage the offerees from accepting that
which amounted to a bargain offer so that the rejected shares could be offered subsequently to
the public at a higher price. 421 U.S. at 725-27.
85. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd 421
U.S. 723 (1975). The majority would have found it difficult to imitate the seventh circuit's
1973 abrogation of Birnbaum, see notes 65-76 and accompanying text supra, for only one year
earlier, in Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972), a different panel of
the ninth circuit had refused to read the purchaser/seller requirement out of a § 10(b) action.
86. 421 U.S. at 731. Justice Rehnquist authored the Court's opinion, in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White joined. Justices Marshall and Stewart joined in Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion.
Birnbaum87and declared that it took a dim view of the "endless case-
by-case erosion" of the Birnbaum rule."8 Justice Blackmun, filing a
strong dissent that cited Affiliated Ute, Bankers Life, National Securi-
ties, and Tcherpenin, found the majority's ruling "quite out of keep-
ing. . . with [the Court's] tradition and the intent of the securities
laws."8 9
One week after Blue Chip, in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 90 the Court ruled narrowly on another recurring and im-
portant question that is often the subject of litigation; namely,
whether a particular transaction involves a security. Prior to Forman
the Court had consistently given the definition of "security" a broad
interpretation, which brought many types of transactions within the
reach of the Acts.9 ' With Forman, the Court may have put an end to
the plaintiff-oriented construction of the term "security."
The Forman plaintiffs purchased shares of stock in a non-profit
state cooperative housing corporation as an incident of tenancy in
the apartments.92 Claiming material misrepresentations and omis-
sions in the offering documents,93 they filed a class action in federal
court. The second circuit, in a decision clearly reflecting the broad
perspective of the Warren Court, held that the cooperative shares
were securities covered by the Acts.94 The court reasoned that be-
cause the Acts' definitions of security include the term "stock," 95 the
shares must be securities.96 Alternatively the court concluded that
the cooperative shares were an "investment contract," another term
87. Id at 749.
88. Id at 755. It is uncertain whether this statement was a warning not to expand excep-
tions to the rule further, or a mandate to cut back the pre-Blue Chip exceptions already in
existence. See note 62 supra.
89. 421 U.S. at 762 (dissenting opinion). Justice Blackmun also cited SEC v. Capital
Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), which held that the SEC does not have to establish
investment advisers' intent to injure and actual injury to clients as a condition of obtaining
injunctive relief against investment advisers under the anti-fraud provisions of § 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). With its expansive holding and
emphasis upon the remedial purposes of the securities laws, Capital Gains fits quite comforta-
bly into the mold of Court decisions reviewed in Part II of this article. Two commentators
have since questioned the soundness of Capital Gains in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976). See Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion; Rule 10b-5 Actions." A Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 785-87
(1976).
90. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
91. Eg., SEC v. W.H. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
92. These shares were not transferable to a nontenant, descended only to a surviving
spouse, and were subject to a right of first refusal in favor of the issuer at the original purchase
price. The sole purpose of the shares was to allow the purchaser to occupy an apartment.
Thus, in effect, their purchase was a recoverable deposit on that apartment. Id at 842.
93. Id at 845.
94. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (1974), rev'd sub nom, United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
95. See note 43 supra.
96. 500 F.2d at 1252-53. This conclusion was supported by a statement from SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943), quoted approvingly in Tcherpenin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967).
used by the Acts to define a security and the traditional touchstone
for testing the presence of a security in doubtful transactions.97 An
essential component of a transaction involving an investment con-
tract is that the investor is offered an expectation of profits,98 and the
court found "profits" in three different forms, including reduction of
tenant costs by income earned from leasing the apartment complex's
commercial facilities.99
The Supreme Court disagreed with both of these rationales,
however, and reversed. First, the Court rejected the literal ap-
proach'00 of the court of appeals in defining a security, concluding
that the presence of a security should be determined not by seman-
tics, but rather by economic realities.' Then, addressing the ques-
tion of an investment contract, the majority again stressed the
economic realities of the transaction,' 02 finding the "income . . . far
too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts." 0 3 Although the Court's unwillingness to
embrace the Second Circuit's literalism and its refusal to adopt a
broad concept of profits might be interpreted as nothing more than
an exercise of reasonable restraint, when one compares Forman with
the Court's earlier record concerning the existence of a security-not
one decision in favor of a defendant-it is clear that Forman is the
product of a changed Court."°
One day after deciding United Housing, the Supreme Court
97. In SEC v. W.H. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946), the Supreme Court defined
investment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party." Since this announcement, the term has usually been equated with all the other
statutory phrases defining a security in §§ 2(l) and 3(a)(10) of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. See
note 43 supra. Therefore, whether a particular transaction involves a security generally turns
upon the presence of an investment contract. Periodically, commentators have attempted,
without much success, to refine or redefine the Howey formulation in their search for a single
standard that can be productively applied to all questionable transactions. For a recent at-
tempt see Newton, What is a Security, A CriticalAnalysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167 (1977).
98. SEC v. W.H. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
99. 500 F.2d at 1254-55. "Profits" were also found in plaintiffs' ability to deduct for tax
purposes a certain portion of their monthly rental payments and in plaintiffs' ability to obtain
apartments at a cost substantially below the going rental charge for comparable housing. Id
The Supreme Court summarily disposed of these two "supposed grounds" for finding profits.
421 U.S. at 855.
100. 421 U.S. at 848. Rejection of a "literal" approach seems consistent, however, with
the Court's repeated emphasis on the triumph of substance over form, see, e.g., SEC v. W.H.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946), even though that emphasis has usually resulted in inclu-
sion of a transaction within the coverage of the Acts, id Prior to United Housing, several
lower courts had rejected the literal approach in cases involving promissory notes. See
Newton, supra note 97 at 171-72.
101. 421 U.S. at 849.
102. Id at 854.
103. Id at 856.
104. See Note, The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: The Cultivation of
a New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. OF CORP. L. 112, 130 (1977). But see Castruccio &
Tischler, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation- 1975, 31 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1858
(1976).
decided Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., "o its first foray into that
part of the 1934 Act known as the Williams Act."° Rondeau had
violated section 13(d)' °7 of the 1934 Act by inadvertently failing to
make a requisite filing upon his purchase of more than five percent
of Mosinee Paper's common shares. In a 2-1 decision the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit °8 held that Mosinee did not need to
demonstrate irreparable harm as a prerequisite to obtaining perma-
nent injunctive relief, which included a five year voting prohibition
on a portion of Rondeau's shares, for a violation of section 13(d).109
The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, disagreed. 110 That Mosinee was
suing under a statute generally recognized as serving the public in-
terest provided no "basis for concluding that [Mosinee was] relieved
of showing irreparable harm and other usual prerequisites for in-
junctive relief.""'
One year later the Supreme Court decided TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway" 12 and followed the pattern established in 1975. Plaintiff
in TSC claimed that a proxy statement furnished it in connection
with a corporate take-over failed to disclose material information"
13
and therefore violated both section 14(a)' 'I of the 1934 Act and SEC
105. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
106. Congress enacted the Williams Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1976) amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964) to subject tender
offerors and others seeking corporate control to advance disclosure requirements for the pro-
tection of investors. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976). In general, § 13(d) requires persons acquiring beneficial
ownership of more than five percent of a class of equity security registered pursuant to section
12 of the 1934 Act to file with the SEC within ten days after the acquisition. The filing requires
comprehensive disclosure about the persons purchasing the security, including their identities,
background, financing, purposes, holdings, and recent transactions in the security. A copy
must be sent to the issuer and to each exchange on which the security is traded.
108. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, sub nom,
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
109. Id at 1017. To "neutralize Rondeau's violation of the Act and to deny him the
benefit of his wrongdoing," id the seventh circuit instructed the district court to enter a decree
that would have prevented 26,268 of Rondeau's shares from being voted on certain matters,
such as a proxy contest, for five years.
110. 422 U.S. at (1975).
111. Id at 65. Dictum in the majority opinion suggests that Rondeau's holding and ra-
tionale are not confined to actions involving permanent injunctions under §13(d). "Mills could
not be plainer in holding that the questions of liability and relief are separate in private actions
under the securities laws, and that the latter is to be determined according to traditional princi-
ples." Id at 64.
For a discussion of the effect of Rondeau on cases dealing with preliminary injunctive
relief, a frequently sought remedy for Williams Act violations, see E. ARANOw, H. EINHORN &
G. BULSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 129-37 (1977).
See also Porter & Hyland, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company and the WilliamsAct Injunc-
tion, 59 MARQ. L. REv.743, 758-61 (1976).
112. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
113. Plaintiff, Northway, a former shareholder of TSC Industries, claimed that the proxy
statement furnished in connection with the sale of TSC's assets to National in exchange for the
latter's securities omitted material facts relating to the degree of National's control over TSC
and the favorability of the terms of the proposal to TSC shareholders. Id at 442-43.
114. See note 10 supra.
rule 14a-9. 1 5 In evaluating plaintiffs summary judgment motion,
the seventh circuit ruled that the standard for determining the mate-
riality of facts omitted from a proxy statement was whether "a rea-
sonable shareholder might consider [them] important.""' 6  In
arriving at this broad formulation, the court of appeals relied on sub-
stantially identical statements concerning materiality in Mills".7 and
Affiliated Ute" 8 certainly no reason existed to suspect that material-
ity should be tested otherwise.'' 9
The seventh circuit, however, did not foresee that a unanimous
Supreme Court would explain away those earlier statements 20 and
rule that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important
in deciding how to vote."' 12 ' The Court rejected the seventh circuit's
"might" standard as an unnecessarily low one that may cause a cor-
poration's management to become litigation shy and "bury the
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information ... 122
2. Restrictive Interpretative Patterns. -Although every Burger
Court holding under the Acts has been narrow, narrowness is not the
only common denominator of the Court's decisions. The Warren
Court's emphasis on the broad, remedial goals of the Acts as a basic
analytic principle has been supplanted by traditional and more cir-
cumscribing interpretative patterns. Included among the patterns
are an emphasis on precise statutory language, a requirement that
interpretation of a particular statutory provision harmonizes with the
overall statutory scheme, and an unwillingness to expand the Acts
unless such an expansion is justified by specific legislative intent or
purpose. 1
23
115. See note 11 supra.
116. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
438 (1976) (emphasis added).
117. 396 U.S. at 384-85.
118. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
119. Besides relying on Mills and Affiliated Ute, the seventh circuit reasoned that its test
was "'entirely consistent with the purposes of disclosure requirements and with the policy of
'resolving doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect.'" 512 F.2d at 332 (cita-
tions omitted).
120. The Supreme Court quite correctly characterized its earlier expressions of materiality
as dicta. 426 U.S. at 446-47, 447 n.9. More than one lower court, however, had assumed that
these "dicta" should control. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp.
981, 986 (D. Del. 1971).
121. 426 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). A brief, but interesting, discussion of materiality
with specific reference to both the seventh circuit and Supreme Court formulations in TSC is
contained in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 930-32 (4th ed. 1977).
122. 426 U.S. at 448. The Court paid lip service to the "recognition in Borak and Mills of
the Rule's [14a-9] broad remedial purpose" and the importance of resolving doubts "in favor
of those the statute [§ 14(a)] is designed to protect." Id Nevertheless, the Court's holding and
analysis undercut these remedial sentiments.
123. The decisions do not evidence a uniform approach to interpretation of the Acts. For
example SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), vividly displays all three patterns, while TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) shows none. Yet the patterns are repeated
in enough decisions to underscore their importance.
a. Statutory language.- A recent decision under the Acts,
SEC v. Sloan, 124 is illustrative of the importance that the Justices
now place on statutory language. 25 Section 12(k) of the 1934 Act
permits the Commission "summarily to suspend trading in any se-
curity. . . for a period not exceeding ten days [if] in its opinion the
public interest and the protection of investors so require."' 26 Plain-
tiff, a shareholder of Canadian Javelin Ltd., claimed that the Com-
mission had exceeded its statutory power when it issued a series of
summary ten-day orders that continuously suspended trading in the
stock for more than one year.'27 The second circuit agreed with
plaintiff, ' 28 and the Commission appealed. In unanimously holding
that "rollover" suspensions exceed the Commission's statutory au-
thority, 29 the Supreme Court 30 found the statutory language com-
pelling in and of itself.
13
b. Harmony with the statutory scheme.- Another technique of
statutory interpretation that is closely related to the Sloan Court's
concentration upon the meaning of words or phrases is to construe a
provision so that it harmonizes with the statutory scheme of which it
is a part. 32 This latter approach was adopted in Ernst & Ernst v.
124. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
125. Besides SEC v. Sloan, see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-201 (1976); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-51 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24
(1977).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976). Section 12(k) was added to the 1934 Act in 1975. It con-
solidated a substantially identical grant of power previously contained in two separate provi-
sions of the 1934 Act. See 436 U.S. at 105 n.1.
127. Trading in CJL was suspended twice. The first suspension lasted from November 29,
1973, until January 26, 1975. The second, which formed the basis for the action against the
Commission, began on April 29, 1975, and ran through May 2, 1976. Id at 106.
128. Sloan v. SEC, 547 F.2d 152, 157-58 (1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
129. Id at 114. Sloan involved a provision of the 1934 Act that is not a common source of
litigation. Moreover, neither the majority nor the two concurring opinions cited any of the
Burger Court decisions discussed in this article. Nevertheless, the Sloan holding, which favors
a narrow reading of the 1934 Act, together with the Court's emphasis on statutory language
and the need to harmonize interpretation with the statutory scheme, see note 132 infra, places
Sloan squarely within the mainstream of the Burger Court's decisions and may have prece-
dential value in other areas.
130. All nine Justices joined in the Court's holding. Justices Brennan and Blackmun filed
concurring opinions with Justice Marshall joining with the former.
131. 436 U.S. at 114. The Court reinforced its reading of § 12(k) by examining other pro-
visions of the 1934 Act empowering the Commission to proceed summarily. These provisions
permit long-term sanctions or continuations of summary restrictions only after notice and an
opportunity for a hearing. Id The importance of statutory language is underscored by the
Court's response to arguments advanced in support of the Commission's interpretation of
§ 12(k), which included a contention that continuous 10-day suspensions further the 1934 Act's
remedial purposes by giving the Commission in certain circumstances the only available effec-
tive weapon to maintain orderly and fair capital markets. Id at 116. Conceding this point for
the sake of argument, the Court nevertheless was not "inclined to read § 12 more broadly than
its language . , . reasonably permit[s]." Id
132. For another decision in which this method is used see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-36 (1975).
Hochfelder. 133
Plaintiffs in Hochfelder were victims of a fraudulent securities
scheme engineered by the president of a failing brokerage firm. For
a number of years, defendant, a national accounting firm, had au-
dited the firm's financial statements. Plaintiffs brought an action for
damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, claiming that if the de-
fendant's audits had not been negligent, the president's fraud would
have been discovered earlier. Crucial to plaintiffs' claim was the fol-
lowing question that for years had occupied courts and commenta-
tors: may a private damages action under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 be predicated upon negligence?' 34
A majority of the Court found the language of section 10(b),
particularly the words manipulative, device, and contrivance, 35 to so
clearly denote intentional misconduct that further inquiry would
have been unnecessary.t 36 Nevertheless, the Court also investigated
whether a negligence standard for private damages actions under
section 10(b) is consistent with the statutory scheme of the Acts, find-
ing that the reduced standard would create disharmony by permit-
ting such actions to continue unhampered by the restrictions of other
provisions that expressly impose liability for negligence. 137 This con-
clusion supported both the majority's reading of the statutory lan-
guage 38 and its holding,'39 by a 6-2 vote, that negligence will not
support a private damages action under section 10(b).11
c. Unwillingness to expand the Acts absent specific legislative in-
133. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
134. See, e.g., the authorities cited in 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12, 197 n.17.
135. See note 29 supra.
136. 425 U.S. at 201. This is consistent with the Court's reliance on strict statutory inter-
pretation. See notes 124-31 and accompanying text supra.
137. 425 U.S. at 206-11. One commentator has stated that the "most portentous aspect of
Hochfelder is the Court's unqualified policy of harmony within the legislative scheme which
seems to run contrary to the continual expansion of the implied cause of action under § 10(b)."
Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and Evaluation of Its Impact Upon the Scheme of
the Federal Securities Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 593 (1977).
138. The Court also found support from legislative and administrative history. 425 U.S.
at 201-06. For an article critical of the Court's rationale see Cox, supra note 137, at 574-86.
139. The Court could have decided Hochfelder more narrowly. See Goldwasser, Ernst &
Ernst v. lochfelder. An Anti-Landmark Decision, 22 N.Y.U. L. REV. 29, 58-59 (1976).
140. At a minimum the majority ruled that negligence is insufficient to support a private
damages action under § 10(b). 425 U.S. at 214. An investigation of the ambiguous trail left by
the majority into precisely what state of mind will support a private damages action under
§ 10(b) is contained in Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Deoine Scienter under Rule lOb-
5; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 218-27 (1977). Professor Bucklo force-
fully argues that a majority of the current Court would hold recklessness sufficient. Id at 227-
40. A large number of the lower courts agree with her. See note 196 infra; see also Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3383 (Dec.
5, 1978) (court held that if a broker owes a fiduciary duty to an investor, reckless conduct by
the broker is the equivalent of scienter). Contra, Liggio, The 'Ernst' Ruling-Expansion ofa
Trend (pt. I), N.Y.L.J., Apr. 14, 1976 at 2, col. 5. Note, The Supreme Court's Trimming ofthe
Section 10(b) Tree- The Cultivation ofa New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. OF CORP. L. 112
(1977).
tent orpurpose.- Close attention to statutory language and regard
for the overall statutory scheme reflect concern that statutory inter-
pretation be consistent with legislative intent and purpose. The
Warren Court broadened the scope of the Acts whenever expansion
was consistent with their remedial purpose;' 4 t nothing required that
Congress have contemplated judicial enlargement or that broaden-
ing by the Court fulfill some specific legislative purpose. That the
present Supreme Court approaches matters quite differently, how-
ever, can be seen from its decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc. 142
The suit in Piper was an outgrowth of a hotly contested struggle
for control of Piper Aircraft Corporation. After narrowly losing the
prize to Bangor Punta Corporation, Chris-Craft sued Bangor Punta
and others 43 for damages under section 14(e)'" of the 1934 Act, a
Williams Act anti-fraud provision covering tender offers. 45  De-
fendants contended that an unsuccessful tender offeror like Chris-
Craft could not maintain a private damages-action under section
14(e). Because the section, like its model, section 10(b), is silent on
the issue of a private damages action for its violation, 46 the Court
turned to legislative history to determine whether implication of a
private action would be "necessary to effectuate Congress' goals"'
147
in enacting section 14(e). The Court concluded that the legislative
history
shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection
of investors who are confronted with a tender offer. . . .We find
no hint in the legislative history, on which respondent so heavily
relies, that Congress contemplated a private cause of action for
damages by one of several contending offerors against a successful
bidder or by a losing contender against the target corporation.
48
Thus, unable to conclude either that implication would further the
specific purpose for which section 14(e) was enacted or that Congress
141. See notes 40-64 and accompanying text supra.
142. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
143. Chris-Craft joined as defendants Piper, members of the Piper family, and the First
Boston Corporation, which had acted as an underwriter for Bangor Punta and an investment
adviser for Piper.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in con-
nection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request or invitation.
145. See note 106 supra.
146. Such silence, of course, did not prevent the implication of a private damages action
by the Warren Court under § 10(b). See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.19 (1971).
147. 430 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).
148. Id at 35. Despite its heavy reliance upon legislative history, the Court cautioned that
the use of this tool in devining congressional intent is a step to be taken cautiously. Id
intended a private damages remedy for defeated tender offerors, the
majority, by a 7-2 vote, refused to read such a remedy into the stat-
ute. 149
Piper astonished many lower court judges, for it "shattered the
nearly universal holdings of lower courts that competing tender of-
ferors had standing to sue each other for damages under the Wil-
liams Act."' 5 °  Nevertheless, the Poer majority's reluctance to
expand the coverage of the Acts absent specific legislative intent or
purpose is consistent with other Burger Court decisions under the
Acts.15  Moreover, Piper is also consistent with the Burger Court's
approach to implied private actions in general. The Piper majority
supported its reading of legislative history by finding that Chris-
Craft's section 14(e) claim failed to meet the implication standards
formulated in Cort v. Ash, 152 in which the Justices used a four-factor
approach5 3 to reject a private damages claim under the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.'1 4 Piper, Cori and
other recent restrictive activity in the implication area' 5 reinforce
the image of a Supreme Court reluctant to permit judicial expansion
without fairly explicit legislative authorization.
5 6
3. Explanations for the Court's Transformation.-The Burger
Court's record under the Acts is remarkable. Seven of its eight deci-
149. Id at 42.
150. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,298, at 92,870 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
151. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 110-15 (1978); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 473, 477-78, 479 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206, 211, 214
(1976). See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 859 n.26 (1975); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33 (1975). See also Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57-59 (1975).
152. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
153. The four factors are as follows: (i) whether plaintiff is a member of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (ii) whether any indication of legislative intent
exists to create or deny an implied remedy; (iii) whether implication is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (iv) whether the claim is one traditionally
reserved for state law. 422 U.S. at 78.
154. The Piper majority's analysis of Cort is set out at 430 U.S. at 37-41. Piper dissenters
Justices Stevens and Brennan found Borak, not Cori, to be controlling. 430 U.S. at 66 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Support for the dissenters' position and a thorough analysis of Piper is
contained in Note, Chris Craft, Changing Perspectives on Contestsfor Corporate Control, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1977). See also The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 70, 280-82 (1977).
155. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (SIPC) (no
implied private right of action under Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aaa-78111 (1970), in favor of customers of failing broker dealer to compel Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corporation to act for their benefit); National R.R. Pass'r Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Pass'rs, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak) (no implied private right of action under
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970), in favor of private individu-
als seeking to enjoin discontinuation of rail service).
156. McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes f,4ction: Reappraisal and
Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167, 187 (1976). The Supreme Court overturned the rulings
of three courts of appeal in Cort, SIPC, and Amtrak. McMahon and Rodos analyze the appel-
late courts' opinions for all three decisions and conclude that they "reflected a judicial disposi-
tion to create remedies in support of perceived legislative objectives. They were a logical
extension of the Supreme Court decisions of the previous ten years." Id at 183.
sions replaced expansive lower court holdings'57 with narrow rul-
ings. The Court abandoned the remedial philosophy of 1964-1972
and substituted a restrictive interpretative approach in its place.
This dramatic turnaround raises a question about the Court's moti-
vation. Although no answer is readily available, a portion of the ma-
jority opinion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green"58 offers several
possible explanations that have also surfaced in the Burger Court's
other decisions under the Acts.
The corporate defendant, Santa Fe, which owned ninety-five
percent of Kirby Lumber, a Delaware corporation,'59 decided to
eliminate the minority shareholders. To accomplish this goal,
known in contemporary parlance as "going private,"'' 61 Santa Fe
used the Delaware short-form merger statute. This provision al-
lowed Santa Fe to squeeze out Kirby's minority shareholders for
cash without obtaining their consent or giving them adVance notice
of the merger. 16  Kirby's minority shareholders asserted violations
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. In sustaining the sufficiency of
plaintiffs' claim, the second circuit held that if plaintiffs allege a
breach of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders,
neither allegations nor proof of misrepresentation or nondisclosure is
required. 1
62
On appeal, a nearly unanimous Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals by finding that a section 10(b) violation must in-
clude deceptive or manipulative conduct. 163 The Court based its
holding on a strict construction of the language of the section,
specifically the terms "manipulative" and "deceptive."" Although
in context this language is sufficiently clear to be dispositive, 165 the
majority reinforced its ruling by setting forth four additional policy
considerations. 1
66
157. Only SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), affirmed the court of appeals.
158. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
159. Santa Fe owned its interest in Kirby through a subsidiary. For a description of the
various corporations involved in the transactions that formed the basis for the litigation, see id.
at 466 n.3.
160. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 121, at 999-1007.
161. DEL. CODE tit. viii, § 253 (1974). Under the Delaware scheme, minority sharehold-
ers' only remedy, upon notification of the merger, is to initiate judicial action to have a court-
appointed appraiser determine whether the shareholders received fair value for their shares. If
they have not, the surviving corporation will be ordered to remedy the situation. Id §§ 253
and 262.
162. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
163. 430 U.S. at 474. This holding has put an abrupt stop to the development of "new
fraud," misconduct other than deception that lower courts during the past several years had
held actionable under § 10(b). See Note, The "New Fraud" Becomes No Fraud Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. P. Green, 31 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977).
164. 430 U.S. at 471-74.
165. Id at 477, citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
166. Id
First, the Court expressed unwillingness to expand the coverage
of the Acts absent evidence that expansion would fulfill some specific
congressional purpose or was contemplated by the legislature.'
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This reluctance is consistent with both the interpretative approach
taken by the Burger Court in several other decisions examined in
this article' 6 and the Court's restrictive attitude towards implied pri-
vate actions. 169  In other words, the Burger Court's decisions under
the Acts are a product of a judicial philosophy markedly more con-
servative than that of the Warren Court.
Second, affirmance of the Second Circuit's ruling would have
increased the federal judiciary's involvement with additional types
of fiduciary self-dealing, a form of misconduct for which the states
have traditionally provided remedies. 7 ° In light of this tradition, the
majority was loathe to enlarge the federal courts' role in this area. 171
This resistance to expansion, especially important for private ac-
tions, 72 has surfaced in other areas. For example, the United
Housing majority pointed out that extension of the federal securities
laws to real estate transactions is an issue involving "important ques-
tions as to the appropriate balance between state and federal respon-
sibility,"' 7 3 resolution of which is more appropriate for the
legislature than the judiciary. "I
Third, the Court questioned the soundness of a ruling that
would have interfered with the corporate laws of many states. 
7
167. Id at 477-79. The majority viewed the fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act-and
§ 10b--o be the full disclosure of a particular transaction rather than insuring the fairness of
its terms. Id at 478.
168. See notes 142-50 and accompanying text supra and note 151 supra.
169. In a recent decision denying a private remedy under § 7 of the 1934 Act, a district
court commented upon the development of "a recent trend away from the wholesale implica-
tion of private rights of action" under the securities laws, citing Cort, Piper, and Santa Fe.
Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1978-Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,528 at 94,089 (D.C. Md.). Two commentators have drawn the same conclusion:
"Under the judicially active Warren Court the absence of express legislative intent was inter-
preted to permit the judiciary to fashion remedies to further social and statutory policies.
Under the Burger Court, however, the absence of express legislative intent militates against
implication." McMahon & Rodos, supra note 156, at 191.
170. 430 U.S. at 478.
171. Id Indeed, since Santa Fe the Delaware Supreme Court has imposed substantive
fairness requirements on freeze-out mergers, ruling that such mergers should not be allowed
absent a valid business purpose and that a merger "made for the sole purpose of freezing out
minority stockholders is an abuse of the corporate process .. " Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). Although it is too soon to conclude that Singer will become the
majority rule, Singer evidences a trend towards greater state regulation of freeze-out mergers.
For a discussion of freeze-out mergers in light of Singer, see Note, Singer v. Magnavox Co..
Minority Rights and Freeze-Out Mergers, 83 DICK. L. REV. 159 (1978).
172. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 40 (1977).
173. 421 U.S. at 859 n.26.
174. Id
175. 430 U.S. at 479. Apparently, the second circuit's ruling would have overridden the
short-form merger provisions of not only Delaware, but also of thirty-seven other states.
Green v. Santa Fe, Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 (2d Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion), rep'd,
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Perhaps many of the Burger Court's decisions are the result of its
reaction to what it perceives as an impractical expansion of the fed-
eral securities laws by the lower courts. 7 6 For example, the Piper
majority noted that agreement with the court of appeals would have
sanctioned the imposition of a multi-million dollar damages award
against Bangor Punta, the successful bidder for Piper. But the Pper
shareholders, who acquired Bangor Punta stock and who are mem-
bers of the class to be protected by the Williams Act, would have
borne a large part of the burden of the judgment.'77 Similarly, in
TSC the Supreme Court expressed a fear that a low standard of ma-
teriality for actions involving proxy rule violations could produce
less meaningful disclosure for the very shareholders that section
14(a) of the 1934 Act was designed to serve.
7 8
Last, the Court pointed to the danger of vexatious litigation that
an expanded plaintiff class could produce. 79 This concern, amplified
in detail in Blue Chip, '8 has found expression in the Burger Court's
three section 10(b) decisions.' 8 ' While it is possible that the Court's
primary concern is the ability of unscrupulous plaintiffs to use sec-
tion 10(b) to harass defendants, it is more likely that the Court was
really apprehensive about the growing number of plaintiffs who are
encouraged by the Warren Court rulings to seek redress through the
federal courts. Although no Supreme Court decision has directly ac-
knowledged this concern, evidence exists that at least some of the
justices are troubled by crowded federal dockets.' 82 In two recent
non-section 10(b) decisions, for example, the Court appears to be
thinking about the increased number of federal actions that the
lower courts' holdings would produce. 183 Moreover, recent rulings of
176. See note 180 infra (Blue Chip); note 109 and accompanying text supra (Rondeau);
and note 103 and accompanying text supra (United Housing).
In 1970 Phillip Kurland wrote that "the Supreme Court has been using federal statutes as
an excuse for absorbing corporation law into the national domain" and that "the lower federal
courts have anticipated the Supreme Court's direction." P. KURLAND, POLITICS THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 61 (1970). He also noted that the Warren Court greatly
expanded federal control over securities law. Id.
177. 430 U.S. at 39.
178. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
179. 430 U.S. at 479.
180. Blue Chip stated that "there has been widespread recognition that litigation under
Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general." 421 U.S. at 739. The opinion then devoted considerable
attention and space to identifying this "vexatiousness" at both the pre-trial and trial stages. Id
at 739-49. Justice Blackmun in dissent criticized the Court on this point for becoming "mire[d]
. . . in speculation and conjecture not usually seen in its opinions." Id at 769-70.
181. See notes 179-80 and accompanying text supra, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976).
182. Various commentators support this proposition. See, e.g.,Liggio, The 'Ernst' Rul-
ing-Expansion of a Trend, N.Y.L.J., April 15, 1976 at 4, col. 5; McMahon and G. Rodos,
supra note 150, at 191; Note, Chris-Craft.- Changing Perspectires On Contests For Corporate
Control, 6 HOFST-A L. REV. 203, 242 (1977).
183. In TSC the Court discussed the probability that management would be subjected to
liability for insignificant omissions or statements in proxy materials if the seventh circuit's
the Burger Court on issues other than those involving the Acts
should reduce the number of plaintiffs able to look to the federal
courts for relief, an effect that was certainly not lost on the Court.'84
Finally, Justice Burger has publicly proclaimed his views about the
need to pare back the amount of litigation in the federal system.,
85
B. Reaction by the Lower Courts
Whatever the Court's motivation, one point seems clear: the
Court's shift since mid-1975 in its approach to the Acts is so striking
that it cannot go unnoticed by the lower courts. While it is too soon
to predict the precise imprint that the Court's recent decisions will
make on the federal securities laws,'86 lower court holdings already
evidence the changes that the Court has wrought.
1. Narrow Holdings.- Although the recent Supreme Court
decisions have not ended the proclivity of all lower courts for plain-
tiff-oriented interpretations of the Acts, 187 recent holdings have been
narrower.'88 One example is SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,"89 in
which the Securities and Exchange Commission sought a permanent
injunction against a corporate executive who inadvertently tipped
material inside information to a securities analyst in violation of sec-
tion 10(b). 9 ' While Hochfelder ruled out a private damages action
grounded only upon negligence,' 9' it left unresolved the nature of a
standard for materiality (see note 122 and accompanying text supra) were to prevail. 426 U.S.
at 448. In other words, a less severe test of materiality would encourage increased litigation in
the federal courts, which, under § 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), have exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims under that Act. See also notes 163-64 and accompanying text
supra.
184. See, e.g., notes 152-56 and accompanying text supra; Cooper & Lybrand v. Livesay,
46 U.S.L.W. 4757 (June 20, 1978) (rejection of "death knell" doctrine that permitted appeal of
prejudgment order denying class certification); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (rejection of private attorney general exception to prevailing Ameri-
can rule that each party to litigation is responsible for own attorneys' fees).
185. Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A.J. 504
(1977); Chief Justice Burger Issues Year-End Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189 (1976).
186. One commentator has remarked that the Supreme Court's recent decisions under the
Acts have "enumerated principles that may circumscribe the rights of plaintiffs under the fed-
eral securities laws for many years to come." Lowenfels, supra note 83, at 892.
187. See note 250 infra.
188. For other decisions not discussed in this article, see, e.g., Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d
612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 941 (1976) (United Housing applicable to shares of stock in
a privately sponsored housing cooperative); Gunther v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ga.
1977) (Hochfelder, Piper, and Santa Fe support rejection of implied private action under sec-
tion 17(a)); Berkowitz v. Baron, 428 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (traditional, and appar-
ently broader, test for materiality in section 10(b) actions questioned after TSC); Bio-Medical
Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein, 407 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Blue Chp supports narrow
construction of connection requirement of rule lOb-5 action); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403
F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (Rondeau irreparable harm requirement may apply to prelimi-
nary injunctive relief under the Williams Act). See also notes 193-94 infra.
189. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
190. For a discussion of § 10(b) liability for tipping, see 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, at
§ 7.5, at 190.11-190.20.
191. See note 140 supra.
defendant's state of mind that the Commission has to establish as a
prerequisite to injunctive relief.192 After reviewing Hochfelder,93 the
district court judge found himself unable to distinguish an injunctive
action from a private damages claim and, therefore, concluded, con-
trary to prevailing pre-Hochfelder authority,'94 that "scienter must
be pleaded and proved whether suit is brought by the SEC or by a
private litigant."' 95 Hence, the executive's inadvertent violation
could not be the basis for an injunction. 96
Another illustration of the narrowing impact of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions is Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v.
DAS4 Corp. 197 Plaintiffs, holders of a small percentage of DASA's
convertible debentures, claimed that the corporation's directors had
violated section 14(a)' 98 of the 1934 Act by breaching a fiduciary
duty to deal fairly with the debenture holders. 99 Until recently, this
type of claim had been at least colorable and had provided a fair
basis for litigation.2 °' A Second Circuit panel, however, rejected the
claim because "'it is clear since the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. . . .that no such duties are im-
192. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
193. A number of recent decisions show the influence of Hochfelder. Eg., Collins Sec.
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (SEC directed to consider applicability of
Hochfelder scienter requirement to broker-dealer enforcement proceedings); Utah State Univ.
v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1977) (something more than mistake or
negligence necessary for violations of stock exchange and NASD rules); Vacca v. Intra Man-
agement Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (Hochfelder applies equally to both
equitable actions for rescission and actions at law for money damages). See Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (reckless behavior sufficiently culpable state
for § 10(b) but definition of reckless behavior should not be a liberal one); Applied Digital
Data Sys. Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157 n.41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dic-
tum) (Hochfelder scienter requirement applicable to § 14(e) private damages actions).
194. The principal pre-Hochfelder authorities, most of which concluded that the Commis-
sion need only establish a negligent violation, are discussed in Berner & Franklin, Scienter and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 Injunctive Action." A Reappraisal in Light of
Hoch/elder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769, 787-92 (1976). Under § 21(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d) (1976), the Commission must establish both that a violation has occurred and that the
violator is engaged, or is about to engage, in a prohibited act or practice.
195. 420 F. Supp. at 1241. See Justice Black's dissent in Hochelder, 425 U.S. at 217-18;
Berner and Franklin, supra note 194, at 781-87; Cox, supra note 137, at 589-92. The second
circuit subsequently affirmed, on other grounds, the district court's refusal to grant the injunc-
tion, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18-19 (1977), which affirmance made it unnec-
essary to decide "whether Hochfrlder mandates abandonment of our long-standing rule that
proof of past negligence will suffice to sustain an SEC injunction action," id at 14. The second
circuit still has not resolved this issue. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Sec., Inc., 574
F.2d 90, 101-02 (1978).
196. 420 F. Supp. at 1242. Many courts do not interpret the scienter requirement so nar-
rowly. See the authorities cited in Berdahl v. SEC, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,359, at 93,238 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978).
197. 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
198. See note 10 supra.
199. Two-thirds of the debenture holders agreed to debenture modifications permitting
the sale of certain DASA assets and reducing the debentures' conversion price. Plaintiffs
claimed that the solicitation seeking consent to the modifications failed to disclose to the de-
benture holders certain conflicts of interest and the unfairness of the conversion price modifi-
cation. 560 F.2d at 1080-82.
200. Id at 1088.
posed by federal law upon corporate directors and that violation of
any such state law fiduciary duties . . . will not support a claim of
constructive fraud under [section] 14(a). .. ."0 This pronounce-
ment probably extends Santa Fe to limits that other courts would
find unacceptable.2 °2 Nevertheless, the use of Santa Fe to block
claims sounding principally in breach of corporate fiduciary duties is
not unusual.2 °3
A final example of a defendant-oriented result attesting to the
effect of a recent Supreme Court decision is Davis v. Rio Rancho Es-
tates, Inc. 21 Plaintiff claimed to be the victim of a land promotion
scheme actionable under the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934
Act.20 5 A threshold question was whether the scheme was a security
under that Act. A clause in plaintiff's purchase agreement reserved
the seller mineral rights to the land purchased, but granted plaintiff
one-half of any mineral production royalties that the seller might
realize.2° Plaintiff contended that this arrangement brought the sale
within section 3(1), which defines a security to include a "certificate
of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas or other mineral royalty or lease. 20 7  The Davis court
thought otherwise, noting that mechanical application of the Acts to
anything literally fitting the definition of a security has been specifi-
cally rejected by United Housing. 208 Echoing the majority opinion in
201. Id at 1084 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
202. A district court judge has noted that in three recent opinions the second circuit "ap-
pears to have taken somewhat different positions concerning the breadth of Santa Fe."
Biesenbach v. Guenther, [1978-Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,363 at 93,248
(E.D. Pa.). He compared the statement from Browning Debenture Holders' Committee with
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217-18 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978) and Cole
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,166 at 92,288
(1978).
203. See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,506 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (Santa Fe's deception requirement applicable to claim under § 14(e)
of 1934 Act); Lavin v. Data Sys. Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (failure to
disclose to shareholders that employee bonus plan was adopted solely for benefit of corpora-
tion's officers and directors not manipulation or deception violative of § 10(b)); O'Brien v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. I11. 1977) (breach of fiduciary
duty by purchase of high-risk securities for discretionary trust and agency account not manip-
ulation or deception violative of § 10(b)); Voege v. The Magnavox Co., 439 F. Supp. 935 (D.C.
Del. 1977) (false statement in merger proxy statement based upon opinion of properly quali-
fied counsel regarding validity of merger under state law not manipulative or deceptive device
violative of § 10(b)).
204. 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
205. Id at 1047.
206. Id at 1050.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1976).
208. 401 F. Supp. at 1050. United Housing supported the district court's rejection of an-
other argument advanced by plaintiff. She apparently claimed that representations that the
developer would build, or encourage other purchasers to build, roads and other improve-
ments--which would of course increase the value of plaintiff's property-constituted the type
of promoter efforts that are the hallmark of a security. Davis ruled that "this is not the type of
managerial service contemplated in. . ., United Housing. Defendants did not promise to run
the development and distribute profits to the plaintiff.. . .There was no management con-
tract between plaintiff and defendants, nor were defendants obligated to perform any such
United Housing,209 the district court reasoned that the "'economic
reality of this transaction is the simple installment sale of a parcel of
real property. The mere possibility of future discovery of minerals
...is too speculative, and too insubstantial, to bring the transaction
within the securities laws."210
2. Statutory Language.- Evidence of the Court's handiwork
can also be found in the lower courts' use of statutory language to
forge narrow holdings.21' In Gunther v. Hutcheson,21 2 plaintiffs as-
serted a claim under section 17(a)213 of the 1933 Act, an anti-fraud
provision that, like section 10(b), is silent on the existence of a pri-
vate action. The district court focused upon the language of section
17(a), stating, "[I]t is readily apparent, and undisputed, that there is
no express private right of action in Section 17(a)." ' 2 4 Finding no
evidence in the legislative scheme or history to support implication,
Gunther rejected plaintiffs' section 17(a) claim.215
3. Harmony With the Statutory Scheme.- Close attention to
statutory language is not the only interpretative tool that produces
narrow holdings. As the district court decision of Redington v.
Touche Ross & Co.2 6 demonstrates, concern about harmonizing a
particular statutory provision with the statutory scheme can also pro-
duce this result. In this suit, which followed the collapse of Weis
Securities, Inc., a large brokerage house, plaintiffs were obviously
reaching for a "deep pocket" from which to recover their losses. Sec-
services." Id at 1050. This portion of the Davis opinion was recently quoted with approval by
the tenth circuit in Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1978).
209. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
210. 401 F. Supp. at 1051. In a different case at the district court level involving the same
land scheme, defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied. The trial judge reasoned
that plaintiffs' affidavits raised a factual question whether the land promotion involved the sale
of a security. "To the extent that Davis... suggests a different result, I [the trial judge] must
respectfully disagree . . . . [Davis/ take[s] a narrow view inconsistent with the flexible and
realistic approach mandated by the Supreme Court. See generally United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)." Jenne v. Amrep Corp., [1978-Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,343 at 93,166 (D.C.N.J.). Compare Jenne's reading of United
Housing with that of Robinson v. United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement
Funds, 435 F. Supp. 245, 246 (D.D.C. 1977).
211. For decisions not discussed in the text, see Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694
(10th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 11977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,257 at 92,695 (W.D. La. 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1226, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'd, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977);
Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 597 n.45 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Cf. Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring and dissenting) (no
implied cause of action under § 206 of Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1977)),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2253 (1978).
212. 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
214. 433 F. Supp. at 45. Gunther quoted from the majority opinion in Hochfelder, which
repeated the advice from Justice Powell's Blue Chip concurrence that "[tihe starting point in
every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself [421 U.S. at 7561." Id at 45.
215. Id at 47.
216. 428 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404 (2d Cir.), cert. granted 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 28, 1978).
tion 17 of the 1934 Act required Weis to make various filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.217 Included in those
filings were Weis's financial statements that had been audited by de-
fendant accounting firm. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants violated
section 17(a) by improperly auditing the financial statements, so that
as fied they presented an overly optimistic picture of Weis's
financial condition and delayed corrective action that presumably
would have prevented the collapse.218
The difficulty with plaintiffs' claim was that section 17 says
nothing about a private damages action for its violation.21 9 More-
over, section 18 of the 1934 Act expressly creates private liability for
the very wrongdoing that plaintiffs charged.22 ° Unfortunately for
plaintiffs, they fell outside the protected class to whom section 18
affords relief. Thus, the district court rejected the section 17 claim.22'
Central to this rejection was the judge's refusal to rule contrary to
the statutory scheme: "The subject matter of the two sections [sec-
tions 17 and 18], their titles, and their juxtaposition would strongly
suggest a legislative intent that the only private claim for a violation
of Section 17 was the claim created in Section 18. "222
On appeal the second circuit could find no evidence of legisla-
tive intent to create a private remedy under section 17.223 By
broadly interpreting the language and purpose of the provision,
however, a split panel decided that plaintiff's claim met the criteria
for implication set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 2 2 4 and
became the first court of appeals to rule on a private damages action
under section 17 of the 1934 Act. Nevertheless the dissent found the
majority opinion flawed by its failure to consider the gloss Piper ad-
ded to Cart -whether implication is a 'necessary adjunct ... to
accomplish the primary congressional goal embodied by the legisla-
tion. '225 This issue the dissent resolved against the plaintiffs.226
In view of the current Court's approach to the securities laws,
217. Section 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976).
218. 428 F. Supp. at 487.
219. See id at 488-89.
220. Section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976) creates a private cause of action for misleading
statements in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act in favor of
any person who purchased or sold a security at a price affected by the misleading statements.
Being neither purchasers nor sellers, plaintiffs could not state a claim under § 18. See Note,
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bite Back into the Toothless Tiger.
47 Fordham L. Rev. 115 (1978).
221. 428 F. Supp. at 491.
222. Id at 489 (emphasis in original). The district court cited Blue Chip as authority.
223. [1978-Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404 at 96,434 (2d Cir.). Nor
did anything indicate congressional intent to deny such a remedy.
224. Id at 93,433-93,435. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
225. [1978-Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 96,404 at 93,441 (2d Cir.) (Mulli-
gan, J., dissenting).
226. Id at 93,443.
particularly in the implication area,22 7 the Second Circuit ruling
seems clearly wrong. It indeed would be suprising if the Court,
which recently granted certiorari from the court of appeals ruling,
228
did not side with the dissent.229
4. Unwillingness to Expand the Acts Absent Specic Legislative
Intent or Purpose. -Two recent decisions from the Southern District
of New York illustrate a third interpretative pattern woven through
several of the Burger Court's decisions, namely, unwillingness to ex-
pand judicially the coverage of the Acts, absent a clear indication
that expansion is consistent with specific legislative intent or pur-
pose.
Superintendent of Insurance v. Freedman23 ° involved a suit by
the New York Superintendent of Insurance as the liquidator of the
bankrupt Knickerbocker Insurance Company. The action grew out
of a sham stock transaction by which a substantial sum of money
was diverted from Knickerbocker to Universal, its parent and sole
shareholder. Rejecting the Superintendent's section 10(b) claim, the
court noted the absence of deception by Knickerbocker, its manage-
ment, or its sole shareholder/parent for whose benefit the stock
transaction had been engineered.2 3 ' The court explained its reluc-
tance to extend section 10(b) protection to Knickerbocker policy
holders and creditors who had clearly been deceived thus:
It should be remembered, however, that the private cause of
action under the Rule [lOb-5] is a judicial creation that was im-
plied notwithstanding the existence of private actions explicitly
provided by other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The Rule
should not be applied automatically to every allegedly fraudulent
transaction arguably involving securities .... [Itl should not be ex-
tended to include within its proscription frauds which do not injure
any public investors nor any purchasers or sellers of securities. Such
extensions are not/ustfiedby the legislative purpose offederal secur-
ities regulation. 23
227. See notes 150-156 and accompanying text supra.
228. 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 18, 1978).
229. Other lower courts have respected the statutory scheme. See Sanders v. John Nuveen
& Co., Inc. 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stems & Co., 549 F.2d
164, 168 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 264 (1977). See Gunther v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp.
42, 45-46 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Braun v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 367, 373-75 (N.D. Ohio
1977).
230. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,262 at 92,714 (1977).
231. Id at 92,718. In derivative actions grounded upon a claim that the corporation has
been involved in a fraudulent securities transaction, courts employ various theories to find the
deception element required for the § 10(b) claim. See the discussion in id at 92,717-78 and 1
A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, at § 4.7(541)-(547), at 84.51-71.
232. Superintendent of Ins. v. Freedman, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,269, at 92,719 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The fifth circuit has held that
promoters' issuance of a corporation's shares for inadequate consideration can give rise to a
derivative action in favor of the corporation under § 10(b) even though all contemporaneous
directors and shareholders of the corporation are privy to the wrongdoing, if the participants in
the fraud intended to defraud future shareholders or creditors. Miller v. San Sebastian Gold
Mines, Inc., 540 F.2d 807 (1976); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (1971).
Freedman distinguished these cases on the ground that the fraud involved investors who later
211
Refusal to extend the Acts past the parameters marked off by
Congress also figured prominently in Nussbacher v. The Chase Man-
hattan Bank. 233 A stockholder instituted a derivative damages ac-
tion against a number of defendants, including Chase. She claimed
that the bank financed her corporation's acquisition of an insurance
company in violation of the credit limitations imposed by section 7
of the 1934 Act and Regulation U.2 3 4 Neither the statute nor the
regulation mentions a private action for its violation.
In moving for dismissal, Chase asked the court to reconsider, in
light of Cort, Piper, and Santa Fe,23 5 a 1970 second circuit deci-
sion 36 that had inferred a damages action under section 7 in favor of
a private investor. In essence the bank argued that protection of pri-
vate investors was not one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting
section 7 and that a private damages action in favor of that class
should not be judicially created. The district court judge agreed with
Chase and dismissed the section 7 claim.2 37 In support of his ruling,
the judge read Piter and Santa Fe as barring recognition of a private
action that does not fulfill some fairly explicit congressional goal.238
Other lower courts have exercised similar restraint.239
5. Lower Courts'Perception of the Burger Court.- Perhaps the
most telling indication of the Supreme Court's recent shift in its atti-
tude toward coverage of the Acts is the express recognition accorded
the turnaround by some lower courts. One of the strongest state-
ments appears in Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc. 24 This action
was born out of an intense take-over battle for Westinghouse Air
Brake, Inc. that Crane lost to American Standard. In 1969 the second
buy shares in the corporation, are members of the investing public, and therefore are arguably
within § 10(b)'s scope. Id at 92,718.
233. 444 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
234. Id at 974-75. Section 7 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8q (1976), gives the Federal
Reserve Board authority to fix margin requirements and makes it unlawful for any broker,
dealer or banker to extend credit in violation of those requirements. Regulation U, 12 C.F.R.
§ 221.1-221.123 (1978), governs loans by banks and prescribes minimum margin requirements
in accordance with § 7.
235. 444 F. Supp. at 978.
236. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
237. The court concluded that § 7 was directed at bolstering the national economy, not at
protecting any private party. 444 F. Supp. at 979. See also, Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1978-Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,528 (D.C. Md.).
238. 444 F. Supp. at 979-80. See note 237 supra
239. See Schy v. FDIC, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,242
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Gluck v. Frankel, 11977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,238 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ga. 1977). See O'Brien
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. 11. 1977);
Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., [1978-Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404 at
93,438 (S.D.N.Y.) (Mulligan, J.) (dissenting opinion), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov.
28, 1978). Cf. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879-87 (2d Cir. 1977) (no implied cause
of action under section 206 of Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)) (Gurfein, J.,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2253 (1978).
240. 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
circuit24" ' found that Crane had standing to bring a damages action
against American Standard for violation of sections 9(a)(2)242 and
10(b) 243 of the 1934 Act. The action was tried in 1976, but Pper was
handed down before the district court reached a decision. The trial
judge then ruled that the second circuit's holding could not survive,
even though liper was not squarely on point.244 The judge also
analyzed the significance of Poer and the Court's other recent deci-
sions.
[PiperJ does not stand alone. It is not sui generis, distinguishable
from all other cases because of unusual facts or esoteric points of
law. Instead, it is one of several recent Supreme Court decisions
which indicate that the Court is taking a hard, new look at federal
jurisdiction under the securities laws. Included in this trend are
[Santa Fe, TSC, Hochfelder and Blue Chi.!
The reasoning of /PiterJ implies that Crane lacks standing to re-
cover in this action. This conclusion is buttressed by the trend
toward a restrictive interpretation of the federal securities laws ev-
idenced by the Supreme Court's recent decisions.2 45
Comparable statements appear in Robinson P. United Mine
Workers of American Health & Retirement Funds .24 In granting de-
fendants' motion for partial summary judgment, Robinson rejected
plaintiffs' argument that an interest in a noncontributory health and
retirement plan is a security under the Acts.247 United Housing,
which supported the district court's reluctance to expand the scope of
the concept of security,248 was characterized as "but one of a series of
241. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970). A second appellate duel resulted in Crane Co. v. American Standard,
Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1976). Section 9(a)(2) makes it illegal to effect "a series of
transactions in any security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or ap-
parent active trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others."
243. The violation centered on American Standard's purchase of 82,400 Air Brake shares
on the last day of Crane's tender offer for Air Brake shares. American Standard concurrently
made undisclosed sales of 120,000 Air Brake shares to two friendly institutions at a per share
price more than $4.00 below the average price of $49.08 American Standard paid for the
shares. 439 F. Supp. at 947.
The second circuit found that American Standard had "painted the tape," by driving up
the price of Air Brake shares to a level that would make Crane's tender offer, with a $50.00 per
share value, appear less favorable. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787,
792 (2d Cir. 1969), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
244. "Although the [Piperl case is not directly analogous, the reasoning of [PiperI appears
to preclude suit by Crane." 439 F. Supp. at 951. The district court opinion then reasoned that
allowing a defeated tender offeror to sue the winner for damages under §§ 10(b) and 9(a)(2)
would contravene Piper's refusal to permit such a result under § 14(e). Id at 951-53. The
decision is analyzed in Note, Securities Regulations-Limiting Private Rights under the An-
ifraud Provisions ofthe Securities Exchange,,Act of 1934, 56 N. C. L. REV. 765 (1978) [here-
inafter referred to as Securities Regulation--Limiting Private Rights].
245. 439 F. Supp. at 953-54, 958.
246. 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977).
247. The presence vel non of a security depended on whether the plan involved an "invest-
ment contract." Id at 246. See note 97 supra.
248. 435 F. Supp. at 246.
recent Supreme Court decisions indicating a pronounced disfavor
with attempts to stretch the securities laws beyond their traditional
scope. E.g., Santa Fe [and] Blue Chp. -
2 49
IV. Conclusion
The Warren Court of 1964-1972 ruled consistently in favor of
plaintiffs invoking the protection of the Acts by approaching statu-
tory interpretation with a pronounced emphasis on the remedial
goals of the legislation. In the face of uncertainty about the coverage
of the Acts, the Court resolved doubts in favor of expansion and of
those plaintiffs that it determined Congress generally sought to pro-
tect. Lower courts, understandably perceiving the Warren Court as
the champion of an expansive attitude toward the Acts, adopted the
Warren Court's remedial philosophy and produced equally broad
holdings that continually enlarged the coverage of the Acts.
Since mid-1975 the Burger Court has uniformly issued narrow
rulings favoring defendants. Accompanying this decisional turn-
around is a pronounced shift in the Court's approach to interpreta-
tion of the Acts. The remedial philosophy of 1964-1972 has yielded
to an emphasis upon statutory language and statutory scheme and to
a marked distaste for judicial expansion of the Acts without clear
legislative mandate.
Probably the most striking aspect of the Burger Court's recent
activity is in the field of implied private actions. Three decisions,
Blue Chip, Hochfelder and Santa Fe, have sharply cut back the po-
tential range of section 10(b), and a fourth decision, Piter, has
249. Id at 247. Robinson and Crane are not alone in their views. In Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), plaintiff corporation sued Barron's and the au-
thor of an article defamatory of plaintiff that appeared in the weekly financial magazine. To
circumvent the difficulties of proof of a libel claim, plaintiff alleged violation of § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. Dismissing the securities law claim, the court stated, "As we have seen recently, the
heyday of the unfettered extension ofthe federal securities laws to recompense all those damages
has ended [citing Santa Fe, Hochfelder and Blue Chip]." 1d at 1353 (emphasis added).
A recent district court decision dismissing § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims stated,
These decisions [Blue Chip, Santa Fe, Piper, Hochlelder and TSCI place a new gloss
on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions requiring the courts to scrutinize with great
care the appropriateness of a federal securities law remedy for certain conduct by
defendants. The Supreme Court in recent decisions has adopted a more limited ap-
proach to § 10(b) and rule lob-5 ....
O'Brien v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 292, 295 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (footnote omitted). See Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein, 407 F. Supp. 970, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1490 (1978); Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1038-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Schy v. FDIC, [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,242 at 92,629 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Voege v. The Magnavox
Co., 439 F. Supp. 935, 942 (D. Del. 1977); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42, 45, 47 (N.D.
Ga. 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 565
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
Many commentators have noted the restrictive trend of the Court. E.g., Castruccio &
Hentrich, Developments in Federal Securities Regulations-1970, 33 Bus. LAW 1645, 1647, 1662
(1978); Note, Securities Regulation, Limiting Private Rights, supra note 244, at 779.
knocked out entirely a private damages claim under section 14(e) of
the 1934 Act. This curtailment was accomplished in a manner that
must be disquieting to those who have viewed the implied private
action as one of the most potent weapons in a plaintiff's arsenal
under the Acts.
The precise reason for the Court's transformation since mid-
1975 remains unclear. The decisions themselves suggest several ex-
planations, including a high court now primarily staffed by conserv-
atives, at least some of whom have decided to limit judicially the
number of plaintiffs able to bring their grievances to a federal forum.
Whatever the explanation, the Court's about-face will have a signifi-
cant impact upon future developments under the Acts. Although
some lower courts continue to opt for an expansive approach to the
Acts, 25 many are reaching narrow holdings by wielding the inter-
pretative tools with which the Burger Court forged its restrictive rul-
ings. Particularly noteworthy are those lower court expressions
signifying a perception of the Burger Court as an advocate of a re-
strictive approach to the Acts.25'
As this article was going to press, the Burger Court decided in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel 252 the significant
issue of whether an interest in a noncontributory, compulsory pen-
sion plan is a security. The Court's ruling, which refused to consider
the pension plan as constituting an investment contract 25 3 and thus a
security, is of interest for at least two reasons. First, the seventh cir-
cuit's determination that the interests were securities expanded cov-
erage of the Acts and ran counter to the flow of the Burger Court's
decisions. Second, the appellate court's opinion, which is exhaustive,
used an approach to statutory interpretation extrapolated from the
Burger Court's opinions. Nevertheless, the Burger Court has issued
too many narrow rulings and too obviously changed its approach to
the Acts to reverse its direction. It is clear, for the present at least,
that the Burger Court is not going to revert to the remedial ways of
the Warren Court.
250. See text following notes 251 infra, 216-28 supra and e.g., Bosse v. Growell, Collier &
MacMillan, 1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,295 at 92,864 (9th Cir.
1977) (2-1 decision) (expansive reading of § 10(b) connection requirement); SEC v. World
Radio Mission Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (lst Cir. 1976) (negligent violation of§ 10(b) suffi-
cient basis for SEC injunctive action) (dictum); Green v. Hamilton Int'l. Corp., 437 F. Supp.
723, 727-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (affirmation of breadth of Bankers Life and narrow reading of
Blue Chip).
251. A survey published in April 1978 summed up lower court activity under the federal
securities laws during the previous year as follows: "With the marked exception of... Daniel
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), . . . the past year
has also witnessed a generally consistent response by the lower courts in following the
Supreme Court's current restrictive trend." Castruccio & Hentrich, supra note 249, at 1647.
252. 47 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1979).
253. See note 97 supra.

